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Existing evidence about the effectiveness of money growth to stimulate economic activity has been 
criticized from different perspectives. In addition, high correlation between money and output is not 
helpful to detect the direction of causality. From a policy perspective, in fact, positive correlation may 
arise from two opposite policy conducts: either the monetary authority sets the supply of money to 
influence future output fluctuations, or the central bank controls money growth as a reaction to the 
recent evolution of macro variables. In this work the relationship between money and output is analysed 
within  a  non  linear  framework  that  ascribes  a  primary  role  to  expectations.  In  particular,  we  find  
evidence that the Lucas (1973) hypothesis, that exists an inverse correlation between the variance of 
nominal shocks and the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, is supported by data evidence 
when the yield curve is either flat or downward sloping. We also provide evidence suggesting that the 
Friedman (1977) hypothesis, that the variability of inflation exerts a negative effect on the natural level 




 JEL classification: C01, C22, E32, E44, G12. 
Keywords: Term Structure, Kalman Filtering, Expectations, Output Growth.    2 
1.   Introduction 
 
Investigating  the  relationship  between  money  and  output  has  always  been  a  major  concern  of 
macroeconomists.  The  classical  dichotomy  about  whether  money  influences  the  future  level  of 
output or, viceversa, whether output fluctuations influence money supply, is still an unresolved 
puzzle. Economists affiliated to the monetarist school believe that money growth will be merely 
reflected in the future price level, at least this is assumed to be true over long horizons. However, 
the monetarist view that money does not affect real output may be a weak argument in the short run. 
On the other hand, Keynesian economists think that short run policies may well influence the level 
of economic activity.  
In this contribution we would like to investigate whether there is a direct relationship between 
money, or a measure of it, and output; alternatively, we examine whether the effect of money on the 
business cycle is contingent to other factors, such as, for instance, the shape of the yield curve.   
We analyse the relationship between money and output within a non linear empirical framework 
that  allows  for  rational  expectations.  In  particular,  we  investigate  whether  the  Lucas  (1973) 
hypothesis, that there is a negative relationship between the variance of nominal shocks and the 
magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, is supported by data evidence. The contrarian 
argument, that the conditional variance of money forecast errors negatively affects the natural level 
of output, has been proposed by Friedman (1977). 
Working with US post-war data, we find evidence that conditioning the examination of the money-
output  relation  to  the  shape  of  the  yield  curve  gives  the  opportunity  of  reconciling  the 
aforementioned  opposite  views
1.  Evidence  seems  to  suggest  that  the  variability  of  inflation, 
captured by the conditional variance of money forecast errors, exerts a negative influence on output 
when the yield curve is upward sloping. There is also some evidence that the Friedman hypothesis 
holds when the linear model is estimated over the entire sample (from 1967 to 2007).  
However,  in  the  regime  characterized  by  a  flat  or  downward  sloping  yield  curve  the  Lucas 
hypothesis seems to prevail. Interpreting the variance of nominal shocks as agents’ perception of 
monetary policy uncertainty, there seems to be an inverse correlation between aggregate uncertainty 
and output response. Aggregate risk displays greater effect the more agents internalize uncertainty. 
In that agents’ actions are driven by a large amount of precaution resulting in mild output changes. 
We thus provide evidence supporting the Lucas hypothesis which is usually rejected by data in 
linear analysis (Kim and Nelson, 1989). 
                                                 
1 Estrella and Mishkin (1997), as well as Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Wright (2006), show, in fact, that a negative spread 
increases the likelihood of a recession in the near future.   3 
The weaknesses of traditional models (King and Plosser, 1984; Ravn and Sola, 2004) coupled with 
the difficulty of detecting a unique direction for causality call for an approach that emphasizes the 
role of expectations. Hence, the contribution of this study is also methodological. We propose to 
examine expectations exploiting a two-level structure: micro and macro. 
At a micro level (bottom level) agents’ expectations focus on the central bank operational procedure 
regarding the supply of money. The micro mechanism of processing available information is based 
on the Kalman filter which implies a continuous refinement of expectations on the basis of past 
prediction errors, i.e. deviations between ex ante expected and ex post observed values of the money 
stock. In such a setting agents form expectations according to a Bayesian iterative sequence that 
combines the re-elaboration of past prediction errors with the analysis of new flows of information. 
Moreover, what is peculiar in the micro analysis of expectations is that Kalman filtering allows 
separating the expected from the unexpected component of money growth. The adoption of a time-
varying approach for the policy rule is also consistent with recent evidence. Cogley and Sargent 
(2006),  as  well  as  Boivin  (2006),  document  important  time  variation  in  the  response  of  the 
monetary  authority  to  the  state  of  the  economy.  Also  Sims  and  Zha  (2006)  point  out  that  the 
changing view of the Fed about the economy has been gradual; they argue it could be attributed to 
the changes of shocks’ variance. Finally, Primiceri (2008) provides evidence that the reaction of 
monetary policy to the changes in both inflation and unemployment has become more and more 
aggressive in the last decades. Last, but certainly not least, we focus on a policy rule expressed in 
terms  of  money  supply  since  our  sample  is  characterized  by  periods  of  inflation  instability; 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1993) argue, in fact, that central banks tend to adopt targets in terms of 
money growth when the inflation rate threatens to be out of control.  
At a macro level (top level) expectations focus on the future economic outlook, as reflected by the 
dynamics  of  the  term  structure  of  interest  rates.  The  macro  perspective  captures  the  sentiment 
regarding  the  future  evolution  of  key  macro  variables  as  well  as  institutional  or  socio-political 
factors, or, eventually, technological changes. There is in fact large evidence that the information 
content of term structure could be used to make inference about the future state of the economy 
(Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1997). Several studies point out that she 
slope of the yield curve help forecasting output fluctuations; more recent evidence focuses on the 
predictive role of term premia implied by the term structure (Hamilton and Kim, 2002; Favero, 
Kaminska, and Soderstrom, 2005; Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei, 2006; Rudebusch, Sack, and Swanson, 
2008;  Modena,  2008  a).  Finally,  Modena  (2008  b,  2011)  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  also 
curvature, and not only extreme points of the yield curve, may be related to output movements.   4 
Furthermore, our methodology partially accounts for the criticism moved by Amato and Swanson 
(2000). Despite some evidence suggests monetary aggregates help predict future output (Stock and 
Watson, 1989; Becketti and Morris, 1992; Feldstein and Stock, 1994), Amato and Swanson point 
out that such evidence might be contingent upon the nature of the dataset. Using real time, rather 
than revised, data they document a substantial reduction of the marginal predictive power of money. 
The threshold approach adopted in this work implies non linearity in the dataset thus breaking time 
continuity; for this reason specifically, it allows reducing the impact of the historical track. 
The rest of the paper is organized as  follows.  The next Section contains a brief survey of the 
literature and discusses motivations. In Section 3 we present some evidence about causality. In 
Section 4 we outline the structure of expectations at the micro level. Empirical evidence is discussed 
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. Data are presented in Appendix I. In Appendix II we 




2.   Motivations and Literature Review 
 
Whether and to what extent money growth is capable of contributing to the determination of real 
output is still an unresolved puzzle in economics. The monetarist view that money growth induces a 
proportional change in the price level leaving real output unaffected is acknowledged to work in the 
medium-long run. However, as Keynesian theory suggests, monetary disturbances are believed to 
have some real effects in the short run. Although the contribution of monetary shocks on permanent 
income growth is limited or absent, managing money supply is a useful instrument under control of 
the central bank for stabilizing or stimulating the economy across the business cycle. 
The  classical  dichotomy  of  money  neutrality,  i.e.  nominal  variables  are  unable  to  affect  real 
variables, has been initially investigated by means of the following equation, which is known as the 
Saint Louis equation since it has been introduced by economists of that Federal Reserve District:    
 
t t t t t t t t t t t trend M M M M IP ε β β β β β α + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − − − − − − 4 12 , 9 3 9 , 6 2 6 , 3 1 3 , 0 3 ,                           (1) 
 
The LHS variable is the quarterly change in the industrial production index; while, the quarterly 
changes of the money stock over the last year are explanatory variables. The above regression also 
includes a constant and a time trend (to account for eventual trend in money and output growth). 
Different  monetary  aggregates  have  been  considered:  M1,  M2,  and  the  U.S.  Fed  Board  of 
Governors monetary base (MB). The analysis is performed on monthly data from 1967 to 2007. 
Empirical results are reported in Table 1. 
   5 
 
. 
Saint Louis Equation -  IP grw (3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   4 β   R
2 
M1  1.2986  -0.1155  0.1551  0.0822  0.0686  0.0013  0.027 
t-stat  (0.1318)  (0.0963)  (0.0312)  (0.2534)  (0.3221)  (0.5490)   
NW   (0.5261)  (0.2251)  (0.1359)  (0.4039)  (0.4407)  (0.7734)   
W  (0.2081)  (0.1465)  (0.0504)  (0.2466)  (0.2651)  (0.5728)   
M2  -0.0020  -0.1238  0.1447  0.1191  0.0593  0.0005  0.094 
t-stat  (0.0710)  (0.0016)  (0.0007)  (0.0051)  (0.1292)  (0.0262)   
NW   (0.4226)  (0.0069)  (0.0027)  (0.0361)  (0.2146)  (0.2781)   
W  (0.1166)  (0.0007)  (0.0001)  (0.0062)  (0.1138)  (0.0364)    
MB  -0.0093  0.4487  0.5870  0.3514  0.3628  0.0001  0.019 
t-stat  (0.4713)  (0.2062)  (0.1004)  (0.3263)  (0.3101)  (0.3757)   
NW   (0.7033)  (0.3348)  (0.1775)  (0.3638)  (0.4721)  (0.6656)   
W  (0.4594)  (0.1458)  (0.0428)  (0.1478)  (0.2115)  (0.3926)   
 
p-values in parenthesis. NW: Newey-West correction. W: White correction. 
 
IP  grw  (3):  3-month  growth  of  the  seasonally  adjusted  industrial  production  index 
(dependent variable). Regressors appear in the equation as quarterly rate of growth:  





The contemporaneous effect on output exerted by M2 turns out to be negative ( 0 β < 0); however, 
more generally, results suggest that the rate of growth of M2 over the last three quarters have a 
positive influence on IP growth ( 1 β , 2 β > 0). The rate of growth of M1 has a marginal, though 
significant, effect on the current growth of the IP index. 
In order to check whether there is a significant influence of money on output we have looked at the 
jointly significance of estimated coefficients in each equation. In all the equations, coefficients turn 
out to be jointly significant supporting the influence of money on output. In addition, we have also 
run a Wald test to check the following restrictions: ∑ = =
3
0 0
i i β , i.e. to check whether money growth 
does  explain  output.  The  null  hypothesis  is  rejected  in  two  cases  since  the  probability  value 
associated to the test is zero for both M2 and MB equations, thus suggesting the influence of these 
monetary aggregates on real activity. M1 growth, instead, does not seem informative about output. 
As a forecasting exercise we have estimated the above regression using the future determination of 
output in the LHS: 
 
t t t t t t t t t t t trend M M M M IP ε β β β β β α + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − − − − − + 4 12 , 9 3 9 , 6 2 6 , 3 1 3 , 0 , 3                           (2) 
 
Results reported in Table 2 suggest that M2, rather than M1 and the monetary base, is effective in 
influencing both the current and the future level of industrial production. In the equation for M2 
both coefficients  0 β  and  1 β  are statistically significant indicating that future output is influenced by   6 
money growth up to six months before. The goodness of fit is definitely poor; however, the M2 
equation returns a much better fit than the other equations. The dynamics of M1 over the most 
recent quarter has a marginal impact on the IP growth. 
 
. 
St. Louis Equation -  IP grw (+3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   4 β   R
2 
M1  0.0228  0.0304  0.0190  0.0215  -0.0181  0.0005  0.025 
t-stat  (0.2877)  (0.0796)  (0.2883)  (0.2321)  (0.2941)  (0.3033)   
NW   (0.6378)  (0.2752)  (0.4457)  (0.2973)  (0.4842)  (0.6076)   
W  (0.3499)  (0.0812)  (0.2828)  (0.1945)  (0.2622)  (0.3162)   
M2  -0.0074  0.2269  0.2916  0.0989  -0.0191  0.0001  0.075 
t-stat  (0.0101)  (0.0223)  (0.0068)  (0.3563)  (0.8461)  (0.0081)   
NW   (0.2359)  (0.1031)  (0.0492)  (0.4050)  (0.8891)  (0.1906)   
W  (0.0197)  (0.0126)  (0.0101)  (0.3488)  (0.8458)  (0.0112)    
MB  -0.0011  0.1584  0.1056  0.1041  0.0086  0.0004  0.017 
t-stat  (0.7192)  (0.0771)  (0.2396)  (0.2474)  (0.9238)  (0.4298)   
NW   (0.8391)  (0.1954)  (0.2347)  (0.3739)  (0.9369)  (0.6890)   
W  (0.6976)  (0.0422)  (0.0674)  (0.1437)  (0.9073)  (0.4349)   
 
p-values in parenthesis. NW: Newey-West correction. W: White correction. 
 
IP grw (+3): quarterly growth of the seasonally adjusted industrial production index 
over  the  next  3-month  period  (dependent  variable).  Regressors  appear  in  the 
equation as quarterly rate of growth:  M1: monetary aggregate M1; M2: monetary 





The macroeconomic debate has further focused on the asymmetric effect of monetary policy on 
output. Models with sticky prices or financial constraints suggest that interest rate changes generate 
greater effect on real activity during recessions. Similarly to Romer and Romer (1994), Garcia and 
Schaller (1999) find evidence in line with this conjecture arguing that monetary policy is more 
effective during recessions. Ravn and Sola (2004) find evidence corroborating the hybrid traditional 
Keynesian asymmetry, that is only small negative monetary policy shocks tend to influence real 
output.  In  order  to  account  for  this  effect  we  estimate  the  above  equations  including  dummy 
variables to distinguish the effect of positive rather than negative money growth rates.   
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Where D
(+) indicates a positive quarterly growth rate of the monetary aggregate, while D
(-) indicates 
a negative growth rate. Results strongly support the hypothesis advanced by Romer and Romer 
(1994). Coefficients are statistically significant only in equation (3), as reported in the top panel of   7 
Table 3, suggesting that only stimulus to economic activity seem to be effective. Moreover, the 
goodness of fit (0.033) of equation (3) is much larger than that (0.006) of equation (4) -bottom 
panel of Table 3-. The F-test suggests coefficients are jointly significant only in equation (3). The 
Wald test confirms that the null hypothesis ∑ = =
3
0 0
i i β  cannot be rejected for equation (3) solely. 
 
. 
Dummies D(+) -  IP grw (3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  1.5221  -0.0924  0.1143  0.1369  0.1591  0.033 
t-stat  (0.0009)  (0.1307)  (0.0538)  (0.0212)  (0.0094)   
   
 
         
Dummies D(-) -  IP grw (3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  2.2632  0.1056  0.0615  0.0301  -0.0415  0.006 
t-stat  (0.0000)  (0.1877)  (0.4278)  (0.6977)  (0.6020)   
 
p-values in parenthesis. 
 
IP grw (3): 3-month growth of the seasonally adjusted industrial production 
index (dependent variable). Regressors appear in the equation as quarterly 
rate of growth:  M1: monetary aggregate M1; D(+): dummy variables that 
capture positive changes of the quarterly growth of the monetary aggregate; 
D(-): dummy variables that capture negative changes of the quarterly growth 





Results are similar when replacing the dependent variable  3 , − ∆ t t IP  with its future realization  t t IP , 3 + ∆ : 
 
. 
Dummies D(+)  -  IP grw (+3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  0.3606  0.0352  0.0335  0.0323  -0.0157  0.032 




Dummies D(-)  -  IP grw (+3) 
   α   0 β   1 β   2 β   3 β   R
2 
M1  0.5663  0.0910  0.0747  -0.0459  0.0242  0.005 
t-stat  (0.0000)  (0.6507)  (0.7008)  (0.8131)  (0.2246)   
 
p-values in parenthesis. 
 
IP  grw  (+3):  quarterly  growth  of  the  seasonally  adjusted  industrial 
production  index  over  the  next  3-month  period  (dependent  variable). 
Regressors  appear  in  the  equation  as  quarterly  rate  of  growth:    M1: 
monetary  aggregate  M1;  D(+):  dummy  variables  that  capture  positive 
changes of the quarterly growth of the monetary aggregate; D(-): dummy 






Although  not  reported,  and  coherently  with  the  estimations  above,  the  joint  estimation  of  an 
equation including all dummy variables, both D
(+) and D
(-), returns significant coefficients only for 
dummies D
(+) denoting an increase of the monetary aggregate.   8 
The main drawback of the above equations is that they are not sufficient to establish any causality 
relation running from money to output. King and Plosser (1984) observe that monetary aggregates 
such as M1 and M2 are determined by the interaction between the high-powered money, a liability 
of the central bank, the behaviour of both firms and households, and the efficiency of the financial 
system through the strategies of the banking sector. Therefore it is possible to observe changes in 
the money stock that anticipate output movements without causing them.  
Endogeneity is the second problem associated with both equations (1) and (2) and equations (3) and 
(4). The high correlation eventually captured by the coefficients of the equations may well derive 
from the conduct of the monetary authority that sets the future supply of money in response to past 
output fluctuations. The chronological sequence of a tight monetary policy which follows growing 
GDP, like a reduction of the rate of money growth whose final goal is to curb economic activity, 
and of an accommodative policy to tackle falling GDP preserves high correlation between money 
and output but with important implications for reverse causation. In addition, from a policy point of 
view,  it  is  impossible  to  ascribe  to  monetary  policy  the  effect  of  money  on  output  without 
simultaneously  considering  the  effect  on  GDP  exerted by  fiscal policies.  The poor  good  of  fit 
obtained for the above regressions is, in fact, a sign of misspecification; in particular, some relevant 
variables may be omitted.  
Finally, the time series analysis performed by estimating the above equations might be affected by 
shifts in money demand since financial innovations contributes to changing agents’ preferences. In 
particular, as Ravn and Sola (2004) argue, the instability of M1 demand may underlie the poor fit of 
the M1 equation; furthermore, and specifically in this analysis, the monthly frequency of data may, 
in principle, accentuate the effect of M1 volatility. 
The aforementioned intrinsic difficulties of detecting the effect of money on output coupled with 
the  devastating  effect  of  the  Lucas  critique  call  for  an  empirical  method  based  on  dynamic 
expectations as that implied by Kalman filtering. Expectations are subject to continuous refinement 
as long as new information becomes available; in addition, agents revisit their expectations on the 
base of past prediction errors. So far, in fact, we have not discriminated between anticipated and 
unanticipated money growth which is a core distinction in economics. In this vein, prediction errors 
work like a proxy for unanticipated money supply. Our approach will be deeply motivated later.  
Before presenting in details the methodology adopted in this chapter, next Section provides some 
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3.   Preliminary Evidence on Causality 
 
In this Section we focus on the causality issue characterizing the empirical relationship between real 
variables and monetary aggregates. Using monthly data from January 1967 to December 2007, we 
start  by  looking  at  dynamic  short-run  correlations.  Each  panel  of  Figure  1  shows  correlations 
between  a  measure  of  real  activity  and  different  monetary  aggregates  (M1,  M2,  and  MB,  the 
monetary  base).  The  top-left  diagram  indicates  that  all  monetary  aggregates  are  positively 
correlated with the Hodrick-Prescott detrended series of industrial production at lags, but negatively 
correlated at leads. Hence, booms (high IP relative to trend) tend to be preceded by high values of 
money growth; while positive values of IP relative to its HP trend tend to be followed by low values 
of money growth. This evidence is in line with the idea that money supply acts as a stimulus to real 
economic  activity;  while  in  response  to  fast-growing  economy,  and  to  the  associated  threat  of 
mounting inflation, the monetary authority inverts the sign of the monetary policy conduct. The 
bottom-left diagram shows the correlations between monetary aggregates and the annual change in 
the unemployment rate. Consistently with the above story, all monetary aggregates are negatively 
correlated at lags with the growth in unemployment, i.e. a reduction in unemployment tends to be 
preceded by high values of money supply; on the other hand, monetary aggregates are positively 
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The top-right diagram of Figure 1 shows the pattern of short run correlations between the change in 
real  consumption  expenditures  and  monetary  aggregates.  Private  consumption  seems  to  be   10 
positively related to money growth in the short run at both leads and lags. The smoother pattern of 
the  monetary  base  correlations  is  consistent  with  the  theory  put  forward  by  King  and  Plosser 
(1984);  they  find  that  inside  money,  i.e.  the  internal  monetary  measures  which  represent  the 
liabilities of the banking sector as a component of monetary aggregates, rather than outside money, 
i.e. the external monetary measures which represent the liabilities of the central bank, are positively 
correlated with real activity. 
Finally, although lower with respect to other real indicators, the bottom-right panel shows that the 
correlation between monetary aggregates and the (log) total capacity utilization is positive at both 
lags and leads; thus both past money supply and expectations of future important money supply 
tend to positively affect the employment of the factors of production.  
Previous evidence is provided by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in a classical contribution about 
the monetary history of the United States; they find that money growth rate changes lead changes in 
real  GDP.  The  left  diagram  of  Figure  2  shows  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  M1  systematically 
anticipates business cycle movements between 1967 and the mid 1980s. Falling money growth 
precedes slowdowns in economic activity; while increasing money stocks anticipate both recoveries 
and booms. However, more recent evidence presented in the right diagram is more controversial: 
starting from 1985, in fact, the relationship between money and output is not as close as before, 
both the length and the magnitude of cyclical fluctuations do not reproduce the preceding dynamics 
of the monetary aggregate. The different pattern of the relationship between M1 and the IP gap 
might be due to financial innovations which affected the demand for money. The greater variability 
of the rate of growth of M1 might also reflect greater difficulty of the money stock to influence 
output from 1986 and 1997. In addition, Choudhry (2002) finds that the stated monetary act of 1980 
considerably affected the income and interest rate demand elasticities of both M1, M2 and their 
components in U.S. Moreover, he argues that the fall in the M1 interest rate elasticity may well 
indicate M1 as possibly a more effective monetary policy tool after 1980.  
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M1  grw:  annual  growth  of 
monetary  aggregate  M1.  IP 
gap  (HP):  industrial 
production  gap  obtained 
with  the  Hodrick-Prescot 
filter. 
Figure 2 
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In line with the above evidence, the following scatter diagrams suggest a stronger effect displayed 
on  both  current  and  future  output  (detrended  IP)  by  M2  rather  than  by  M1  or  MB
2.  The  top 
diagrams show the scatter between the IP gap and the contemporaneous growth rate of the monetary 
aggregates. In the bottom panels we report the scatter plots between the actual HP-detrended IP and 

































































































































Scatter plot diagrams. IP gap (HP): industrial production gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescot filter. M1 grw: annual 
growth of monetary aggregate M1. M2 grw: annual growth of monetary aggregate M2. MB grw: annual growth of the 
monetary base. (-12) means the twelfth lag (monthly frequency of data). 
Figure 3 
 
As  Walsh  (2003)  points  out  “while  suggestive,  evidence  based  on  time  patterns  and  simple 
correlations may not indicate the true casual role of money. Since the Federal Reserve and the banking 
sector respond to economic developments, movements in the monetary aggregates are not exogenous, 
and the correlation patterns need not reflect any casual effect of monetary policy on economic activity”. 
Notwithstanding the above mentioned stronger influence on real variables exerted by M2 than other 
aggregates, the Granger causality tests suggest M1 being the only source capable of affecting the 
future level of both industrial production and total capacity utilization. The null hypothesis that the 
rate of growth of M1 does not cause the IP gap cannot be rejected, as well as the null that M1 does 
not cause (log) TCU. The real personal consumption expenditure seems to be caused in the Granger 
sense by all monetary aggregates. Results are reported in Table 5.  
 
                                                 
2 The regressing line associated to M2 is, in fact, always steeper. The only exception occurs in the mid-bottom panel, the regressing 
line associated to MB turns out to be marginally steeper than the one associated to M2. However, in the former case (MB) there is a 
greater vertical dispersion of observations around the regressing line; in the latter case (M2), instead, observations more closely 
concentrated around the regressing line along its entire length.    12 
. 
Granger Causality Test 
  lags  IP gap (HP)  TCU (log)  unemp  r-cons 
M1  3  (0.0432)  (0.0296)  (0.8090)  (0.3827) 
 
6  (0.0577)  (0.0158)  (0.8598)  (0.0063) 
   12  (0.7340)  (0.6834)  (0.1455)  (0.0066) 
M2  3  (0.1971)  (0.1568)  (0.6825)  (0.0013) 
 
6  (0.2398)  (0.4621)  (0.2978)  (0.0005) 
 
12  (0.4150)  (0.2986)  (0.1740)  (0.0050) 
MB  3  (0.5173)  (0.5698)  (0.7667)  (0.0321) 
 
6  (0.7928)  (0.9175)  (0.7430)  (0.1002) 
   12  (0.2935)  (0.2558)  (0.3408)  (0.0436) 
 
Null  Hypothesis:  the  monetary  aggregate  does  not  Granger-cause  the  real 
variable. Tests p-values in parenthesis. 
 
IP gap (HP): industrial production gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter; 
TCU (log): log-series of the total capacity utilization; unemp: unemployment 
rate; r-cons: real personal consumption expenditures. M1: monetary aggregate 





The Granger tests are also employed to investigate whether lagged levels of the real variables help 
to  predict  the  future  path  of  monetary  aggregates.  Results  are  significantly  supportive  in  this 
respect, as shown in Table 6. Such statistical evidence about causality is compatible with a Taylor-
type monetary policy reaction function implying the monetary authority to raise the policy rate 
when the pace of economic growth is as fast as to create undesired inflationary pressures. 
 
. 
Granger Causality Test 
  lags  M1  M2  MB 
IP gap (HP)  3  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0765) 
 
6  (0.0231)  (0.0003)  (0.0239) 
   12  (0.0914)  (0.0004)  (0.1145) 
unemp  3  (0.0100)  (0.0002)  (0.1510) 
 
6  (0.0408)  (0.0006)  (0.3795) 
 
12  (0.0606)  (0.0136)  (0.4834) 
TCU  3  (0.0055)  (0.0170)  (0.4816) 
 
6  (0.0321)  (0.0053)  (0.0407) 
 
12  (0.1117)  (0.0136)  (0.1669) 
r-cons  3  (0.0046)  (0.0005)  (0.0778) 
 
6  (0.1192)  (0.0008)  (0.1646) 
   12  (0.3280)  (0.0340)  (0.6395) 
 
Null  Hypothesis:  the  real  variable  does  not  Granger-cause  the 
monetary aggregate. Tests p-values in parenthesis. 
 
M1: monetary aggregate M1; M2: monetary aggregate M2; MB: 
monetary base. IP gap (HP): industrial production gap obtained 
with the Hodrick-Prescott filter; TCU (log): log-series of the total 
capacity  utilization;  unemp:  unemployment  rate;  r-cons:  real 
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We sum up the preliminary evidence discussed in this Section by saying that results regarding the 
effect  of  money  on  output  turn  out  to  be  somehow  ambiguous.  Short  run  correlations  tend  to 
suggest a positive influence of lagged money on actual output; however, the Granger tests partially 
contradict this evidence by suggesting a causality relationship working in the opposite direction. In 
addition, despite the existing evidence suggesting that money helps to predict future output (Stock 
and Watson, 1989; Becketti and Morris, 1992; Feldstein and Stock, 1994), Amato and Swanson 
(2000) argue that results are someway misleading because they crucially depends on  revised, rather 
than real time, monetary aggregates data. 
The aforementioned ambiguity can be dealt with by introducing a new element in the analysis; we 
thus  attribute  a  role  of  primary  importance  to  agents’  expectations  and,  in  particular,  to  the 
associated expectations errors. To conclude, we recall that the choice of M1 as the benchmark 
reference aggregate for the monetary policy rule in the following analysis hinges on the results of 




4.   Empirical Methods for Expectations  
 
In this Section we summarize the approach employed to derive agents’ expectations about the future 
stance of monetary policy as captured by the rate of growth of M1.  
King  and  Plosser  (1984),  in  fact,  suggest  inside  money,  a  component  of  M1  representing  the 
liabilities of the banking sector, being highly correlated with business cycle movements. In addition, 
Bernanke and Mishkin (1993) argue that the monetary authority tends to define targets in terms of 
money growth if there is a concrete likelihood that inflation gets out of control. Our sample is 
characterized by periods of high and volatile inflation. Finally, we justify the time-varying approach 
by observing that there is substantial evidence highlighting that both the monetary policy conduct 
and the variance of nominal shocks have changed over time (Cogley and Sargent, 2006; Boivin, 
2006; Sims and Zha, 2006; Primiceri 2008).  
We thus compute expectations by applying the Kalman filter, since it provides with an effective 
formalisation of the mechanism through which agents form expectations rationally. Moreover, the 
Kalman approach gives the opportunity of deriving a measure of innovations which overcomes the 
criticism traditionally moved to the VAR approach. In what follows we briefly outline the main 
features of Kalman filtering.  
The observation equation, or measurement equation, of the state-space system is: 
 
t t t t u x a M + + = ∆ − β 1                                                                                                                         (5)   14 
 
Actual quarterly money growth is a function of the changes of the T-bill rate, of the price level, and 
of the money stock over the previous quarter;  t u  is a stochastic  ( ) u d i i σ , 0 . . .  noise. The specification 
of the money equation come from Mishkin (1982) and Weintraub (1980); it has been successively 
considered by Kim and Nelson (1989). The only difference is that we rule out the fiscal variable, 
because of the superior independence achieved by the monetary authority in recent times. The state, 
or transition, equation captures the evolution of coefficients over time: 
 
t t t v F + + = −1 β µ β                                                                                                                          (6) 
  
Where  t v   is  an  idiosyncratic  disturbance  ( ) v d i i σ , 0 . . . .  Following  standard  practice,  we  impose 
matrix F to be the identity matrix since we assume that the regressing coefficients follow random 
walk processes (Kim and Nelson, 1998; Kim and Nelson, 2006; Boivin, 2006). The Kalman filter is 
an iterative algorithm based on updating the informative set with most recent available information 
and predicting future movements of the variable under examination. The coefficients covariance 
matrix conditional on information available up to time t-1 is: 
 
( )( ) [ ]
I
t t t t t t t t E P 1 | 1 | 1 | − − − − − = β β β β                                                                                                        (7) 
 
Equation (8) provides the prediction of money growth based on information available up to time t 
given  that  economists  know  the  econometric  relationship  linking  the  core  variable  to  the 
explanatory variables till time t-1.  
 
1 | 1 | − − = ∆ t t t t t x M β                                                                                                                                 (8) 
 
Once the actual contemporaneous value of the core variable is observed, agents can compute the 
prediction error according to the following  
 
1 ! 1 | 1 | − − − ∆ − ∆ = − ∆ = t t t t t t t t t M M x M β η                                                                                               (9) 
 






1 | 1 | ε σ η + = = − − −
I
t t t t t t t t x P x E h                                                                                                         (10) 
 
According to (10) Kalman filtering allows two sources of uncertainty generating the conditional 
variance  of  the  forecast  error  ( 1 | − t t h ).  One  source  depends  on  the  evolutionary  behaviour  of   15 
estimated coefficients through the coefficients covariance matrix, thus capturing the gradual change 
of the policy regime over time; the other source is a random noise related to future disturbances, 
like unpredictable institutional or technological shocks. The assumption of a constant variance of 
nominal shocks to money growth seems too severe since aggregate M1 is regarded to respond on a 
great variety of shocks. First, M1 trivially depends upon the monetary policy conduct through the 
money supply (high-powered money). Second, M1 is affected by the interaction between money 
supply and money demand, so that a demand shock, rather than a supply shock, may influence 
aggregate M1. For instance financial innovations as well as deregulation may affect M1 in the 
medium-short run. Finally, M1 depends also on the strategic decisions of the banking system and on 
the credit market conditions. Therefore, a measure of variance which is conditional to the state of 
the economy provides with a more realistic picture of aggregate risk. 
An  alternative  method  to  compute  the  time-varying  conditional  variance  is  to  estimate  an 
autoregressive  model  for  money  growth  (either  AR  or  VAR,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the 
analysis), and then to compute the squared of fitted residuals




5.   Empirical Results 
 
In this Section we provide evidence that the Lucas hypothesis, i.e. that exists a negative relationship 
between the variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of output response to nominal shocks, 
usually rejected in linear model, holds when the likelihood of a slowdown in economic activity is 
warned by financial indicators. Evidence also suggests that the alternative Friedman hypothesis, that 
the  augmenting  variability  of  inflation  exerts  a  negative  effect  on  output,  tends  to  hold  when 
financial indicators anticipate a thriving pace of economic growth. 
A  crucial  issue  involved  in  testing  the  Lucas  hypothesis  is  the  examination  of  the  conditional 
variance of nominal shocks over time. Hence, the analysis starts with the estimation of time-varying 
monetary policy function expressed in terms of money rather than in terms of the rate of interest. 
The inverse relationship tying money supply and interest rates is trivially respected in any modern 
economy; moreover, the extensive sample period covered in this analysis calls for a generic version 
of the monetary policy rule. 
After  estimating  a  time-varying  specification  of  equations  (5)  and  (6),  we  obtain  a  series  of 
prediction errors ( 1 | − t t η ) and a measure of forecast errors’ conditional volatility ( 1 | − t t h ). The basic 
equation to test the Lucas versus the Friedman hypothesis is the following: 
                                                 
3 In Appendix II we provide with a comparison between the conditional variances of money growth prediction errors obtained both by 
Kalman filtering and by autoregressive modeling.   16 
 
t t t t t t t v gap h gap + + + + = − − − 1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 0 α α η α α                                                                                     (11) 
 
Where the output gap is the HP de-trended series of log IP. In addition, coefficient  1 α  is set equal to 
1 | 1 0 1 − + = t t h γ γ α . The functional form of  1 α  is motivated with the aim of reducing the effect of 
multi-collinearity in the OLS regression. Equation (11) thus becomes  
 
( ) t t t t t t t t t t t v gap h h gap + + + ⋅ + + = − − − − − 1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 1 | 0 0 α α η γ η γ α                                                           (11’) 
 
The inclusion of the first lag of the dependent variable, which is highly correlated with its actual 
level, certifies the robustness of other coefficients estimates. In addition, different computational 
methods  for  the  variance-covariance  matrix  have  been  employed  in  order  to  obtain  consistent 
estimates  (White,  1980;  Hansen  and  Hodrick,  1980;  Newey  and  West,  1987;  and,  finally,  the 
simplified Hansen and Hodrick). 
The  theory  advanced  by  Lucas  is  satisfied  when  both  0 0 > γ   and  0 1 < γ ;  while,  testing  the 
Friedman hypothesis is equivalent to detecting whether coefficient  2 α  is negative ( 0 2 < α )
4. The 
assumption here is that the conditional variance of money forecast errors acts as a proxy for the 
variability  of  inflation.  The  original  idea  put  forward  by  Friedman  (1977),  in  fact,  is  that  the 
variability of inflation, rather than that of money, reduces the natural level of output since it disturbs 
the allocation efficiency of the price system. 
The linear model (11’), estimated over the entire sample 1967-2007, does not reveal any particular 
information  about  the  way  nominal  shocks  affect  business  cycle  fluctuations.  Table  7  shows 
estimation results for different measures of the business conditions. The dependent variable in the 
top panel is the Hodrick-Prescott measure of the IP gap; (from the top to the bottom) in the second 
panel the dependent variable is the log total capacity utilization; in the third panel the dependent 
variable is the rate of unemployment; finally, in the bottom panel, the dependent variable is the rate 
of change of unemployment
5.  
There is weak evidence supporting the Friedman hypothesis. Although coefficient  2 α  is inversely 
related to the dynamics of real variables, it is either marginally or not significant with the only 
exception holding for unemployment. The Lucas hypothesis is definitely rejected. Coefficient  0 γ  is 
                                                 
4 Trivially it holds the opposite sign of coefficients when the dependent variable is either the unemployment or its rate of change.  
5 Coefficient  3 α  in equation (11’) multiplies the first lag of the respective dependent variable.    17 
not statistically significant. In two cases coefficient  1 γ  turns out to be significantly positive thus 




joint estimation  -  IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.1198  0.0436  -0.0158  -0.0182  0.9444  0.906 
t-stat  [-1.423]  [1.238]  [-1.143]  [-1.544]  [64.75]   
W  [-1.346]  [1.485]  [-1.325]  [-1.410]  [54.71]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-1.501]  [1.884]  [-1.552]  [-1.702]  [95.31]   
NW (12)  [-1.342]  [1.634]  [-1.449]  [-1.531]  [55.74]   
s-HH  [-0.656]  [1.474]  [-1.181]  [-0.812]  [22.92]    . 
. 
joint estimation  - TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.9839  0.0163  0.0283  -0.0003  0.9780  0.974 
t-stat  [2.893]  [0.958]  [2.181]  [-0.846]  [127]   
W  [-2.816]  [0.971]  [2.107]  [-1.123]  [124]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-1.894]  [0.880]  [2.409]  [-1.835]  [83.27]   
NW (12)  [-1.839]  [0.873]  [2.291]  [-1.360]  [80.98]   
s-HH  [-0.918]  [1.267]  [1.174]  [-0.848]  [40.26]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  -  Unemployment 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.2986  -0.1251  0.0012  0.0077  0.9870  0.985 
t-stat  [-0.805]  [-0.301]  [0.522]  [2.458]  [173]   
W  [-0.771]  [-0.298]  [0.786]  [2.895]  [149]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-0.472]  [-0.462]  [0.973]  [2.991]  [83.63]   
NW (12)  [-0.501]  [-0.339]  [0.881]  [3.005]  [88.19]   
s-HH  [-0.257]  [-0.398]  [0.555]  [1.323]  [53.01]    . 
. 
joint estimation  - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.1502  -0.0852  0.0861  0.0102  0.9634  0.933 
t-stat  [0.027]  [-0.867]  [1.710]  [0.134]  [76.10]   
W  [0.027]  [-0.812]  [2.189]  [0.137]  [59.75]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [0.031]  [-1.700]  [5.122]  [0.208]  [89.14]   
NW (12)  [0.027]  [-0.968]  [2.819]  [0.158]  [49.62]   
s-HH  [0.013]  [-1.139]  [1.719]  [0.075]  [25.62]   
 
t-statistics in square brackets. 
 
OLS: ordinary least squares estimation; W: White correction; HH: Hansen 
Hodrick correction; NW: Newey-West correction; s-HH: simplified Hansen-





The linear estimation of equation (11’) is not entirely reliable though, since the pattern of residuals 
series is affected by heteroscedaticity in all cases. In addition, a strong ARCH effect is found after 
                                                 
6 In Appendix II we report the estimation of equation (11’) using an alternative measure of the conditional variance of  money growth 
forecast errors leading to similar results. In particular, after estimating an unrestricted VAR (9) model of money growth, inflation, 
and the change in the 3-month T-bill rate, we obtain the conditional variance of money forecast errors as the squares of residuals 
from the money growth equation.    18 
performing  the  Engle  (1982)  test.  The  recursive  residuals  and  the  CUSUM  square  of  residuals 
reveal the instability of coefficient estimates as reported in Figure 4
7. Finally, also the Hansen tests 



















CUSUM sqr 5% significance  
Figure 4 
 
Therefore, we consider  a non linear version of  model (11’) allowing for two different regimes 
determined by slope of the term structure, i.e. the difference between the 10-year and the 3-month 
yields
8. The slope of the yield curve is believed to reflect agents’ expectations about the future 
stance of monetary policy and, thus, it is thought to anticipate business cycle movements (Estrella 
and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1997). Conditioning the test of the Lucas hypothesis 
to the slope of the term structure means to relating agent’s expectations to a leading economic 
indicator  (Stock  and  Watson,  1989).  In  particular,  the  yield  curve  represents  a  link  between 
monetary policy, the financial sector and the real economy. We recall that the peculiar aspect of this 
methodology  is  to  consider  expectations  on  a  double  level.  At  the  first  level,  the  micro  level, 
expectations are modelled through Kalman filtering the money supply function in order to isolate 
prediction errors (Section 4). At the second level, the macro level, expectations have a forward-
looking nature in that they are intended to capture the future evolution of the economy as reflected 
by the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates. Macro expectations interpret a perspective 
sentiment  present  throughout  the  economy,  a  broad  view  regarding  the  economic  conditions, 
including political as well as institutional, or technological, factors.  
A crucial issues to be pointed out is that the micro level analysis of expectations is performed on a 
monetary policy function expressed in terms of money supply. While, the macro level expectations 
are  inferred  by  the  evolution  of  the  yield  curve,  whose  dynamics  depends  not  only  on  the 
determination of the policy rate, or a measure closely related to it as it may be the effective federal 
funds rate, but also on the abovementioned factors. The choice of the monetary policy function in 
terms of the money stock is thus intended to separate two different levels of expectations’ analysis. 
                                                 
7 Figure 4 reports tests when the dependent variable is the HP filtered IP series; tests for other equations with different real variable 
offer very similar results. 
8 Similar results are obtained if the threshold variable is the spread between the 5-year and the 3-month yields.   19 
We aim at distinguishing the  expectations regarding the operational procedure  of the monetary 
authority in setting the money supply from the overall movements displayed by the yield curve.  
Although there exists an unquestionable inverse relationship linking money supply and short rates, 
the evolution of the yield curve, as well as the determination of expectations at a macro level, 
depend on a greater variety of factors. So that we believe our approach is immune from the criticism 
that the micro and macro structures for expectations share a common root
9.  
The threshold methodology implies that the same equation is estimated in two different regimes 
depending on the values assumed by a predetermined variable (τ ), i.e. the yield spread which is a 








> + + + ⋅ + + =
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τ τ α α η γ η γ α
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ˆ
1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 1 | 0 0
1 3 1 | 2 1 | 1 | 1 1 | 0 0
if v gap h h gap
if v gap h h gap
t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t
                              (12) 
 
Regime 1 is determined by values of the yield spread below the estimated threshold (τˆ ); hence, the 
first regime is characterized by a flat or downward sloping yield curve. The conventional view tends 
to associate such a regime to an imminent slowdown in economic activity. On the other hand, 
regime 2 is defined on high values of the spread (positive slope of the yield curve) reflecting an 
accommodative stance of monetary policy. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), as well as Estrella and 
Mishkin (1997), present important evidence that the yield spread is related to the future evolution of 
real  activity.  In  particular,  a  downward  sloping  or  a  flat  yield  curve  augments  the  odds  of  a 
recession in the near future. Along the same line Wright (2006) finds a link between the shape of 
the yield curve and the probability of future economic slowdowns. 
Estimation results for regime 1 (below the estimated threshold) are show in Table 8. The Lucas 
hypothesis seems to be respected regardless the variable used to measure the business cycle. The 
conditional  variance  of  money  growth  affects  real  variables  through  the  coefficients  of  the 
prediction-error term ( 1 γ ). The direct influence of the conditional variance implied by the Friedman 
hypothesis is not significant with the only exception for the IP gap equation, where surprisingly the 
effect of the conditional variance appears to work in the opposite direction. However, this is far 
from being paradoxical as long as when the economy is going toward a recession, a peak in the 
variability  of  inflation,  captured  by  the  conditional  variance  of  money  growth,  might  act  as  a 
stimulus to economic activity, or might be interpreted as a sign that the recession is neither severe 
nor long-lasting. 
                                                 
9 If we had chosen to apply the Kalman filter to a monetary policy rule (Section 4) expressed in terms of the policy rate the criticism 
might have been appropriate.   20 
 
. 
REGIME 1 - IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.4327  0.0291  -0.0118  0.0080  0.9039  0.860 
t-stat  [1.603]  [1.524]  [-1.809]  [2.246]  [19.60]   
W  [2.083]  [2.245]  [-1.893]  [2.358]  [21.60]  obs 74 
HH (12)  [2.857]  [2.644]  [-1.838]  [5.067]  [19.49]   
NW (12)  [2.222]  [2.004]  [-1.693]  [2.533]  [18.95]   
s-HH  [0.912]  [1.975]  [-1.557]  [1.630]  [12.74]    . 
. 
REGIME 1 – TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.6857  0.0242  -0.0119  0.0017  0.9844  0.968 
t-stat  [-1.584]  [2.651]  [-2.632]  [0.971]  [100]   
W  [-1.531]  [2.373]  [-2.188]  [1.017]  [97.12]  obs 355 
HH (12)  [-1.474]  [2.134]  [-1.993]  [1.448]  [93.61]   
NW (12)  [-1.463]  [2.256]  [-2.080]  [1.194]  [92.99]   
s-HH  [-0.809]  [2.928]  [-2.967]  [0.777]  [51.40]   
. 
. 
REGIME 1 – unemployment 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.2949  -0.0472  0.0232  -0.0063  0.9967  0.985 
t-stat  [0.071]  [-2.188]  [2.177]  [-1.547]  [146]   
W  [0.073]  [-1.914]  [1.790]  [-1.611]  [145]  obs 362 
HH (12)  [0.081]  [-1.761]  [1.708]  [-1.842]  [129]   
NW (12)  [0.084]  [-1.875]  [1.812]  [-1.692]  [143]   
s-HH  [0.033]  [-2.399]  [2.409]  [-1.356]  [70.28]    . 
. 
REGIME 1 - unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.1966  -0.0126  0.0622  0.0174  1.0198  0.913 
t-stat  [-2.558]  [-2.175]  [2.148]  [1.553]  [47.98]   
W  [-2.615]  [-2.551]  [2.484]  [1.566]  [43.52]  obs 248 
HH (12)  [-6.869]  [-2.325]  [2.147]  [4.158]  [37.65]   
NW (12)  [-3.198]  [-2.257]  [2.189]  [1.843]  [43.36]   
s-HH  [-1.532]  [-2.305]  [2.357]  [1.217]  [39.38]   
 
t-statistics in square brackets. 
 
OLS: ordinary least squares estimation; W: White correction; HH: Hansen 
Hodrick correction; NW: Newey-West correction; s-HH: simplified Hansen-





Generated variables in the above regression might invalidate inference procedures. To handle with 
it  not  only  we  propose  alternative  measures  of  the  standard  errors  (White,  1980;  Hansen  and 
Hodrick, 1980; Newey and West, 1987; the simplified Hansen and Hodrick), but also we perform a 
Monte Carlo simulation. Results show a clear convergence of both Lucas parameters towards the 
true values just after few thousands replications ( 0 γ  in the left panel;  1 γ  in the right panel). The top 
diagrams show the simulation with 15000 replications, while in the bottom diagrams we run 50000 
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The estimation of regime 1 has also been performed after ruling out the conditional variance of 
money prediction errors. Results are reported in Table 9. There is a clear confirmation that the 
Lucas hypothesis is not rejected by the data when the yield curve is either flat or downward sloping. 
 
. 
REGIME 1 - IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0414  0.0245  -0.0123    0.9554  0.843 
t-stat  [1.152]  [2.963]  [-3.007]    [58.41]   
W  [1.143]  [2.599]  [-2.449]    [49.35]  obs 74 
NW (12)  [1.143]  [2.438]  [-2.279]    [50.81]   
. 
. 
REGIME 1 – TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.5250  0.0254  -0.0125    0.9878  0.968 
t-stat  [-1.261]  [2.852]  [-2.861]    [104]   
W  [-1.183]  [2.529]  [-2.342]    [98.19]  obs 355 
NW (12)  [-1.126]  [2.391]  [-2.207]    [93.54]   
. 
 
t-statistics in square brackets. 
 












   22 
 
 
REGIME 1 – Unemployment 
0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.1997  -0.0532  0.0265  0.9998  0.985 
t-stat  [-0.513]  [-2.503]  [2.525]  [153] 
W  [-0.535]  [-2.243]  [2.124]  [147]  obs 362 
NW (12)  [-0.557]  [-2.151]  [2.124]  [152] 
. 
. 
REGIME 1 - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.0843  -0.0179  0.0522    1.0085  0.911 
t-stat  [-3.209]  [-1.891]  [1.841]    [50.35]   
W  [-3.237]  [-1.941]  [1.833]    [45.45]  obs 248 
NW (12)  [-3.298]  [-1.872]  [1.778]    [45.00]   
 
t-statistics in square brackets. 
 




Table 9 (b) 
 
Before showing results for the second regime we would like to offer an insight about the above 
results. When the variance of nominal shocks tends to be relatively high, it is also true that the 
actions  of  the  monetary  authority  are  governed  by  a  considerable  amount  of  uncertainty,  since 
predictions errors are quite volatile. Thus, if the central bank cannot easily recognize which is the 
most suitable strategy to be implemented given the current economic scenario, economic agents 
internalize  such  insecurity  and  assume  more  balanced  and  measured  behaviors,  for  instance 
consumers stop spending money on superfluous goods, and firms refrain from investing in capital 
goods. Aggregate actions result in output responses that are mild, i.e. of lower magnitude. Hence, 
there is an inverse relationship between variance of nominal shocks and the magnitude of business 
cycle fluctuations. This relationship is also true when the variance of nominal shocks tends to be 
relative small. Suppose the yield curve is flat due to severe monetary policy correctly expected by 
agents (again this case perfectly fits regime 1), in such an atmosphere output would react heavily 
falling below the steady state level thus preserving the inverse correlation highlighted by Lucas 
(1973).   
Regime 2 is characterized by high, and positive, values of the yield spread. Regime 2 estimates are 
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. 
REGIME 2 - IP gap (HP) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.2375  0.0059  0.0009  -0.0371  0.9436  0.904 
t-stat  [-2.683]  [0.170]  [0.064]  [-2.949]  [57.55]   
W  [-2.902]  [0.220]  [0.096]  [-3.213]  [48.44]  obs 394 
HH (12)  [-2.731]  [0.214]  [0.090]  [-3.033]  [62.92]   
NW (12)  [-2.685]  [0.194]  [0.082]  [-3.045]  [52.57]   
s-HH  [-1.558]  [0.136]  [0.054]  [-2.332]  [39.26]    . 
. 
REGIME 2 - TCU 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.4740  0.0351  -0.0076  -0.0041  1.012  0.982 
t-stat  [0.787]  [0.815]  [-0.480]  [-2.502]  [73.79]   
W  [0.690]  [1.023]  [-0.694]  [-3.385]  [64.84]  obs 113 
HH (12)  [1.948]  [1.039]  [-0.814]  [-4.501]  [181]   
NW (12)  [0.911]  [1.044]  [-0.711]  [-3.227]  [85.78]   
s-HH  [0.930]  [0.603]  [-0.363]  [-2.308]  [86.72]    . 
. 
REGIME 2 – Unemployment 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.3876  -0.0263  0.0131  0.0096  0.9874  0.938 
t-stat  [0.394]  [-0.223]  [0.301]  [2.114]  [77.32]   
W  [0.246]  [-0.249]  [0.412]  [3.314]  [46.66]  obs 106 
HH (12)  [0.476]  [-0.237]  [0.439]  [5.850]  [63.61]   
NW (12)  [0.325]  [-0.214]  [0.381]  [4.067]  [50.27]   
s-HH  [0.452]  [-0.157]  [0.217]  [1.904]  [95.88]   
. 
. 
REGIME 2 - Unemployment grw 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.1910  -0.0211  0.0983  0.0169  0.9416  0.953 
t-stat  [2.664]  [-0.842]  [1.026]  [1.745]  [63.27]   
W  [2.906]  [-0.780]  [1.119]  [2.050]  [51.02]  obs 220 
HH (12)  [6.212]  [-0.752]  [1.164]  [4.223]  [39.94]   
NW (12)  [3.392]  [-0.767]  [1.165]  [2.377]  [45.15]   
s-HH  [1.618]  [-0.627]  [0.803]  [1.468]  [58.52]   
 
t-statistics in square brackets. 
 
OLS: ordinary least squares estimation; W: White correction; HH: Hansen 
Hodrick correction; NW: Newey-West correction; s-HH: simplified Hansen-





The monetary accommodation reflected in the upward sloping term structure is usually expected to 
stimulate economic activity thus pushing the economy on an expansionary path. On the other hand, 
a positive slope of the yield curve implies a positive risk premium required by investors to move to 
longer horizons. In particular, Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2008) find evidence that the slope of the 
nominal term structure is due to a positive inflation risk premium. In case of perfect foresight about 
future spot rates, in fact, the arbitrage mechanism would equalize holding period returns along the 
entire spectrum of maturities implying a flat yield curve. In a context characterized by imperfect   24 
information, uncertainty causes the term structure to deviate from its risk-neutral implied shape. 
The joint effect of uncertainty and economic growth is reflected in a greater variability of expected 
inflation, and, thus, in the dynamics of the conditional variance of money growth (Barro, 1976; 
Friedman,  1977).  Therefore,  the  threshold  estimation  of  regime  2  should  return  a  significant 
coefficient  2 α  stressing out the inverse relationship between the money conditional variance and 
the economic cycle. Coefficient  2 α  is, in fact, negative in the equations expressed in terms of the IP 
gap  and  the  total  capacity  utilization;  while,  coefficient  2 α   turns  out  to  be  positive  when  the 
dependent variable is unemployment or its rate of change. As Rudebusch, Sack and Swanson (2007) 
have  found,  this  result  can  be  interpreted  in  the  sense  that  there  exists  an  inverse  correlation 




6.   Concluding Remarks 
 
In  this  work  we  propose  and  implement  an  innovative  method  for  expectations  in  order  to 
investigate the relationship between money and output. Previous evidence tends to support the view 
that money is effective in stimulating real economic activity; however, some contrarian evidence 
suggests the issue is still controversial. In particular, the high correlation between money and output 
does  not  reveal  an  unambiguous  direction  of  causality.  From  a  policy  perspective,  in  fact,  the 
aforementioned positive correlation can derive from two opposite phenomena. On the one hand, the 
monetary authority can govern the supply of money to influence the future economic conjuncture; 
on the other hand, the central bank can manage the dynamics of monetary aggregates in response of 
past macroeconomic conditions. In addition, the weaknesses associated to traditional approaches 
call for an effective role of expectations. 
After estimating a time-varying monetary policy rule where expectations are analysed at a micro 
level, we condition the examination of the money-output relationship to the shape of the  yield 
curve. In particular, in this paper we test the Lucas (1973) hypothesis against Friedman’s (1977). 
Within a non linear approach, we find evidence that the conditional variance of money growth 
affects  real  output  through  the  coefficients  on  the  forecast  error  term  in  the  Lucas-type  output 
equation only when the flat shape of the term structure reflects expectations of a slowdown in 
economic activity. Moreover, the conditional variance of money growth, which is used as a proxy 
for inflation variability,  appears to affect directly  output, thus corroborating Friedman’s theory, 
when the term structure is upward sloping, i.e. investors require a positive term premium. 
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Appendix I  -  Data 
 
All data have monthly frequency; the sample starts in January 1966. The core econometric analysis, after 
Kalman filtering, is thus performed from January 1967 since, prudently, we rule out the first 12 observations.  
The U.S. series of seasonally adjusted industrial production is from the FRED database (Federal Reserve 
Economic Data). The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate series (civilian unemployment), as well as the 
total capacity utilization index, are from the FRED database; the source is the U.S. Department of Labour 
(Bureau  of  Labour  Statistics)  indeed.  The  series  are  covariance  stationary  as  suggested  by  both  the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test.  
The ADF test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root; while the null hypothesis of stationarity cannot be 
rejected by the KPSS test. To match the monthly frequency of data, the rule of thumb selected number of 
lags in the auxiliary regression is either 11 or 12. The automatic lag selection based on different criteria 
(Akaike, Schwarz, Hannan-Quinn) is consistent with our choice. Unit root test results obtained with the 
automatic lag selections are similar. The critical values of the KPSS test are 0.739 (1%), 0.463 (5%), and 




adf  (aic) 
[lag] 
adf  (sic) 
[lag] 
adf  (hq) 
[lag]  pp (b)  pp (q)  kpss (b)  kpss (q) 





[13]  (0.1576)*  (0.1397)*  0.2652*  0.2161* 





[16]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.0521*  0.0454* 





[12]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.5193*  0.4683* 
M1 grw  (0.0043)*      
[12] 
(0.0210)*   
[13] 
(0.0043)*      
[12]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.7103*  0.9431* 
M2 grw  (0.0036)*       
[17] 
(0.1160)*      
[13] 
(0.1160)*     
[13]  (0.0465)*  (0.0440)*       0.9783*  1.3169* 
MB grw  (0.0879)*    
[13] 
(0.0879)*    
[13] 
(0.0879)*    
[13]  (0.0088)*  (0.0163)*  0.4564*  0.5296 







[13]  (0.0000)*  (0.0001)*  0.5873*  0.5244* 
IP gap (HP)  (0.0000)*    
[9] 
(0.0000)*    
[3] 
(0.0000)*    
[3]  (0.0001)*  (0.0000)*  0.3804*  0.4213* 





[4]  (0.1347)*  (0.1429)*  0.1849*  0.2589* 





[16]  (0.0011)*  (0.0007)*  0.2707*  0.3901* 





[3]  (0.0176)*  (0.0189)*  0.4238*  0.5549* 
 
Sample: jan 1967 - dec 2007; * Exogenous: intercept.  
 
adf:augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test;  pp:  Phillips-Perron  test;  kpss: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin  test  ;  
aic: Akaike; sic: Schwarz; hq: Hannan Quinn; b: Barlett; q: quadratic special kernel. 
 
ffr: effective federal fund rate;y3m grw3: 3-month rate of growth (grw) of the 3-month yield; M1 grw3: 3-
month rate of growth of monetary aggregate M1; M1 grw: annual rate of growth of monetary aggregate M1; 
M2 grw: annual rate of growth of monetary aggregate M2; MB grw: annual rate of growth of monetary base; 
infl(3) (cpi grw3): 3-month rate of growth of the seasonally adjusted consumer price index; IP gap (HP): 
industrial production gap obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott filter; unemp: unemployment rate; unemp grw: 
annual change in the rate of unemployment;log(tcu): log-series of the total capacity utilization.  
 
. 
Table 11   29 
 
In Table 12 the stationarity tests are carried out on both the forecast error and the conditional variance series 
obtained from the monetary policy function expressed in terms of money growth. As mentioned above in the 
text both the time-varying parameter model estimated by Kalman filtering and the vector autoregressive 
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[lag] 
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[lag] 
adf  (hq) 
[lag]  pp (b)  pp (q)  kpss (b)  kpss (q) 
















[4]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.3061*  0.3221* 















[3]  (0.0000)*  (0.0000)*  0.1686*  0.1728* 
 
Sample: jan 1967 - dec 2007; * Exogenous: intercept. Supersctipt m indicates the modified version of the test.  
 
adf:augmented Dickey-Fuller test; pp: Phillips-Perron test; kpss: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test ;  aic: 
Akaike; sic: Schwarz; hq: Hannan Quinn; b: Barlett; q: quadratic special kernel. 
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Appendix II    
 
In Table 13 we report the estimations of equation (11’) after deriving the prediction error and the respective 
conditional variance series from a vector autoregressive model of order 9. The conditional variance series is 
obtained computing the square of the residuals in the money equation of the VAR(9) system (Piazzesi, 
2003). Money growth, the inflation rate, and the quarterly change of the T-Bill rate are the endogenous 
variables; the constant is the only exogenous variable. The number of lags has been selected on the basis of 
the Akaike and Schwarz criteria. Results tend to support the Friedman hypothesis rather than the Lucas’ one. 
The dynamics of the real variables seems to be lowered by the conditional variance of money growth, which 
is regarded to be a proxy for price volatility. 
 
. 
joint estimation  -  IP gap (HP) - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0473  -0.0491  0.0190  -0.0194  0.9497  0.905 
t-stat  [0.150]  [-0.283]  [0.139]  [-1.074]  [66.56]   
W  [0.153]  [-0.264]  [0.259]  [-2.332]  [55.23]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [0.110]  [-0.234]  [0.211]  [-1.791]  [188.0]   
NW (12)  [0.109]  [-0.232]  [0.224]  [-2.239]  [62.41]   
s-HH  [0.045]  [-0.271]  [0.229]  [-0.722]  [23.57]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - TCU - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0819  0.0190  -0.0002  -0.0346  0.9813  0.974 
t-stat  [2.472]  [0.101]  [-0.106]  [-1.748]  [130]   
W  [2.329]  [0.096]  [-0.202]  [-3.611]  [122]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [1.600]  [0.096]  [-0.178]  [-2.412]  [84.32]   
NW (12)  [1.549]  [0.089]  [-0.184]  [-2.935]  [81.73]   
s-HH  [0.778]  [0.096]  [-0.174]  [-1.225]  [40.95]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - Unemployment - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  0.0580  -0.0344  -0.0008  0.0776  0.9903  0.985 
t-stat  [1.656]  [-0.747]  [-0.236]  [1.625]  [176]   
W  [1.499]  [-0.669]  [-0.403]  [3.233]  [147]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [0.854]  [-0.784]  [-0.520]  [4.039]  [81.21]   
NW (12)  [0.909]  [-0.681]  [-0.433]  [3.691]  [86.19]   
s-HH  [0.504]  [-0.733]  [-0.398]  [1.088]  [53.49]   
. 
. 
joint estimation  - Unemployment grw - VAR(9) 
  0 α   0 γ   1 γ   2 α   3 α   R
2 
OLS  -0.0397  -0.0411  0.0038  0.0253  0.9626  0.934 
t-stat  [-0.202]  [-0.381]  [0.458]  [2.245]  [79.95]   
W  [-0.207]  [-0.377]  [0.808]  [4.536]  [64.59]  obs 468 
HH (12)  [-0.150]  [-0.571]  [1.449]  [4.195]  [102]   
NW (12)  [-0.146]  [-0.513]  [1.086]  [3.948]  [54.29]   
s-HH  [-0.061]  [-0.365]  [0.755]  [1.538]  [26.23]   
t-statistics in square brackets 
. 
Table 13 